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This paper explores the politically determined development objectives and the intrinsic 
logic of government intervention policies in east developed countries. It is argued that the 
distorted institutional structure in China and in many least developed countries, after the 
Second World War, can be largely explained by government adoption of inappropriate 
development strategies. Motivated by nation building, most least-developed countries, 
including the socialist countries, adopted a comparative advantage defying strategy to 
accelerate the growth of capital-intensive, advanced sectors in their countries. In the paper 
we also statistically measure the evolution of government development strategies and the 
economic institutions in China from 1950s to 1980s to show the co-existence and co-
evolution of government adoption of comparative advantage defying strategy and the 
trinity system. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, many economists believe that least developed countries (LDCs) failed to 
catch up with the developed countries because of bad institutions with weak protection for 
property rights and ineffective constraints on power holders (Acemoglu et al. 2004). At the 
same time, how to understand government behaviour becomes the most important issue for 
research on institutions. Both policy reformers and researchers from a very diverse set of 
perspectives have tried to understand how government intervention and regulation occur 
and how they can subsequently shape the macro incentive structure that firms in an LDC 
face.  
 
Although the economists and policymakers have hotly debated the merits of government 
behaviours and their relationship with the formation of institutions, such issues can be 
roughly framed within the context of the so-called ‘helping hand’ (Pigou 1938) versus the 
‘grabbing hand’ taxonomy in the literature. An alternative strand of the grabbing hand 
view (Shleifer and Vishny 1994) holds that the government interventions are pursued for 
the benefits of politicians and bureaucrats. For example, politicians use regulations to 
favour friendly firms and other political constituencies, and thereby obtain benefits such as 
campaign contributions and votes.1  
 
Suppose that government regulations in the LDCs could arise from the grabbing hand of 
government or political elites. The unsolved question in the literature is how to understand 
the evolution of institutional structure under government interventions. In the LDCs, the 
institutional structure shaped by government interventions is quite complicated. We 
wonder what are the incentives for political leaders to design such complicated systems, 
because the increased expropriation costs and political control due to the complexity of 
institutions would diminish the gains of grabbing. Corruptions induced by the special 
interest groups might not be a good answer for this question either, because the benefited 
groups are often taxed or suppressed alongside with the protections/subsidies. Actually, 
many interventions do not have obvious beneficiary groups.  
 
Beyond the views from the helping and grabbing hand categories, there are also other 
theories suggesting that government regulations and controls over firms in the developing 
countries might root in the high cost of collecting public funds and the poor taxation 
system. For example, Gordon and Li (2005a, b) argued that the financial disintermediation 
and informal economy might make tax enforcement difficult, and politicians have to 
design the distorted structure of taxation and red tape towards industry. Or, as the 
administrative weakness is exaggerated, government is likely to control the production 
capacity directly by state ownership (Esfahani 2000). Such existing viewpoints definitely 
                                                 
1 A recent paper by Djankov et al. (2002) provided an empirical test on theories of the grabbing hand, say, the 
barrier for business entry might arise from corrupt bureaucrats.   2
reveal some intrinsic features of government behaviours in LDCs, but the characteristics of 
institutional structure are still partially captured. Actually, the regulatory policies adopted 
in LDCs are much more complicated than their theoretical settings. In addition, the 
researchers also offer few insights into the motivations of politicians to collect the public 
funds overburdening the economy.  
 
This paper will explore the politically determined development objectives and the intrinsic 
logic of government intervention policies with the comprehensive implications for 
institutional building in LDCs. We argue that the distorted institutional structure in China 
and many LDCs after the Second World War can be largely explained by government 
adoption of inappropriate development strategies. Motivated by nation building, most 
LDCs, including the socialist countries, adopted a CAD (comparative advantage defying) 
strategy to accelerate the growth of capital-intensive, advanced sectors in their countries. 
Many firms in the priority sectors of CAD strategy were non-viable in open, competitive 
markets because they did not have comparative advantage in the priority sectors. Therefore, 
to maximize resource mobilization for building up the priority sectors and to support non-
viable firms in those sectors, a regulatory system had to be established. According to Lin 
et al. (1996, 1999, 2003), such a system was characterized by the trinity of a macro-policy 
environment of distorted prices for products and essential factors of production (for 
example, trained personnel, funds, technologies, resources, etc.), highly centralized 
planned resource allocation and a micro-management mechanism in which firms had no 
decision making powers.  
 
First, if government wants to implement a CAD strategy and promote the status of capital-
intensive industry, it must either distort artificially the relative prices of factors and 
products, or subsidize the heavy industry sector by collecting taxes from the light industry 
sector. Owing to information asymmetry, costs for the heavy explicit tax collection are 
prohibitively high. The government then has to resort to artificially distorting relative 
prices of input factors and products, for example, depressed interest rate, exchange rates 
and prices of popular goods, prerequisite for the prioritized development of the heavy 
industries. Second, when the price of a product or a factor is artificially set below its 
equilibrium price, the demand will be stimulated and the supply will be suppressed. 
Implementing the planned resource allocation system was the objective demand to solve 
the contradiction that gross demand exceeds gross supply under the distorted macro policy 
environment and to guarantee resources go to prioritizing industries. Third, the planning 
system makes the imbalance of returns between the light and heavy industries, which 
drives the firms transfer of resources to non-prioritized industries. Alternatively, with the 
missing competition and the distorted prices, the profitability of an enterprise is not 
determined by its performance. If the firm were given autonomy, due to the information 
asymmetries between the government (the principal) and the firm manager (the agent), 
managers and workers would inevitably prey upon its profit and assets. To avoid the 
investment arbitrage and the erosion of profits and state assets, the state has to deprive 
enterprises of autonomy.    3
We will statistically measure the evolution of the development strategy of government and 
the economic institutions in China from 1950s to 1980s, including the deviation of industry 
structure from the fundamentals, the distorted relative prices both for the agricultural and 
industrial products and endowment factors, scope of material allocation by state, and the 
extent of state ownership of industrial firms. It shows that this trinity system of 
government controls does exist concurrently with CAD strategy.  
2  CAD strategy and viability  
After the Opium War of 1840, China, once an influential nation, began to decline. Chinese 
political leaders and intellectuals devoted their lives to the ideals of a strong nation and a 
prosperous people. In 1949, the founding of the People’s Republic marked a new era of 
China’s history. According to China’s development level and the knowledge available to 
its leaders at that time, industrialization was virtually synonymous with economic 
development and the goal of eliminating poverty and backwardness. The ambitious 
government leaders believed that to defend the newly established socialist system, and to 
keep pace and even overtake Western industrial countries, rapid industrial development, 
especially the establishment of heavy industry, were essential.2  
 
Learning mainly from the Soviet experiences, the Chinese government began to formulate 
and implement the first Five-Year Plan that gave priority to heavy industrial development 
from 1953. In the first Five-Year Plan, heavy industrial development was put in a strategic 
position. The central and backbone projects of industrial construction in the first Five-Year 
Plan were the 156 key projects designed with aid from the former Soviet Union. During 
the first five year period, investment in heavy industrial infrastructure accounted for 85 per 
cent of total industrial infrastructure and 72.9 per cent of total investment in agricultural 
and industrial infrastructure.  
 
However, the development strategy of prioritizing heavy industries was inconsistent with 
China’s endowment structure. During the initial period of China’s economic development, 
capital was in very short supply, hence market interest rates were naturally high while 
labour was rather cheap. The cost of developing capital-intensive heavy industries was 
extremely high and such industries would have no competitiveness in an open and free 
competitive market economy.3 If resources had been allocated by the market mechanism, 
investment would not have flowed to heavy industry sectors. Rather, industrialization with 
light industry would have occurred, which would have been contradictory to the goal of 
implementing the heavy industry-oriented development strategy. To support the non-viable 
                                                 
2 The development strategy is exogenously determined by political consideration. In fact, in addition to China 
and socialist countries, many non-socialist developing nations, notably those in South Asia and Latin America, 
made similar choices, and their economic systems had many features in common with the Chinese system. 
For the discussion on the historical causes of CAD strategy, see Lin et al. (2003: chapter 2).  
3 See Lin and Tan (1999).   4
firms, institutional arrangements were made, and the barriers to heavy industry 
development were lowered artificially. Then, the catch-up strategy, the distorted macro-
policy environment, the planned resource allocation system and the rigid micro-
management institutions would be left intact.  
 
To illustrate how the viability problem may arise, assuming there is a simple economy that 
possesses two given factor endowments, capital and labour, and produces only one good. 
Each point on the isoquant shown in Figure 1 represents a technology of production or a 
combination of capital and labour required to produce a given amount of a certain product. 
The technology represented by A is more labour intensive than that of B. C1, C2, and C3 
are the isocost lines. The slope of an isocost line represents the relative prices of capital 
and labour. In an economy where capital is relatively expensive and labour is relatively 
inexpensive, as represented by isocost lines C2, and C3, the adoption of technology A to 
produce the given amount of output will cost the least. When the relative price of labour 
increases, as represented by the isocost lines by C1, production will cost the least if 
technology B is adopted.  






















In a free, open, and competitive market economy, a firm will be viable only if it adopts the 
least-cost technology in its production. In Figure 1, if the relative prices of capital and 
labour can be presented by C2, the adoption of technology A costs the least. Market 
competition will make firms that adopt technologies other than A nonviable. On the other   5
hand, the relative prices of capital and labour are determined by the relative 
abundance/scarcity of capital and labour in the economy’s factor endowments. Therefore, 
the viability of a firm depends on whether its choice of technology is on the least-cost lines 
determined by the factor endowments of the economy. Most importantly, we need to 
clearly define the indicators measuring development strategy. According to Lin (2003), we 
construct a technological choice index (TCI) based on the capital intensity of the 
manufacturing sector to measure a country’s choice of development strategy and in turn 










=           ( 1 )  
 
where / it it MKM L is the capital-labour ratio of the manufacturing sector, and  / it it KL  is the 
capital-labour ratio of the ith economy in year t. This index not only reflects how much the 
government’s preference for developing capital-intensive industries is, but also can be used 
to measure how much the economy is distorted by the government. Given the development 
stage of a country, the higher this index is, the more an economy is distorted. Lin (2003) 
found this index well explained the economic growth in a cross-country empirical analysis. 








=         ( 2 )  
 
where AVMit is the added value of manufacturing industries of the ith country in year t; 
GDPit  is the GDP of the ith country in year t; LMit is the labour in the manufacturing 
industry, and Lit is the total labour of ith country in year t.4 If a government adopts a CAD 
strategy to promote its capital-intensive industries, this index is expected to be larger than 
otherwise. This is because a country that adopts a CAD strategy in its manufacturing 
industries will be more capital intensive and absorb less labour ceteris paribus. So, two 
measures have the similar nature in statistics. Figure 2 shows the basic description about 
the TCI 1 and 2 for China from 1952 to 2002.5 
                                                 
4 The industry data on the output, the fixed capital stock and labour was collected from various issues of 
China Industry Statistical Yearbook, and the total value of fixed capital stock was devaluated by the index of 
fixed-asset investment price taken from the various issues of China Statistical Yearbook. The national data on 
the output, the fixed capital formation, and labour was collected from China Compendium of Statistics 1949-
2004 and various issues of the China Statistical Yearbook. The capital stock at national level was calculated 
by the perpetual-stock method. 
5 Two indicators measuring CAD strategy miss capturing the policy change and distortion during the Great 
Leap Movement. The government produced the poor-quality iron and steel by the backyard furnaces and 
millions of farmers were forced to join into the iron and steel manufacturing instead of harvesting the crops. 
The number of industry workers increased from 14.02 million in 1957 to 44.16 million in 1958 and decreased 
to 28.79 million in 1959. That is, although the government launched a political movement for a faster pace 
   6












































































































TCI1 TCI2  
3  The trinity system in China 
To maximize the resource mobilization for the capital-intensive-oriented industrialization, 
a planned system had to be established. The logic for the trinity of intervention policies 
characterizing the CAD strategy is as follows:  
(1) A macro policy environment with depressed interest rate, exchange rate and prices of 
popular goods was prerequisite for prioritized development of heavy industry. 
(2) Implementing the planned resource allocation system was the objective demand to 
solve the contradiction that gross demand exceeded gross supply under the distorted 
macro policy environment and to guarantee resources went to heavy industries.  
(3) The micro management institution without any autonomy was implemented in order to 
prevent enterprises from corroding profits and state assets taking advantage their 
operation rights. In the rural areas, the People’s Commune system was to guarantee 
state monopoly of procurement and marketing of agricultural produces.  
 
Due to this huge scale, the government had to collect heavy explicit taxes from the 
economic sectors that were generating a surplus and create direct financial subsidies for the 
non-viable industries. But such a surplus would have come only from the small and 
                                                                                                                                               
industrialization, but the technology level for industrial production was low. However, capital-labour ratio 
measures the embodied technology level in the production, while TCI means the deviation of technology 
adoption in the industry from the fundamentals. Then, by these measures, the CAD strategy reached the peak 
in accord with the ‘Three Line Construction’ in the late 1960s, other than the ‘Great Leap Movement’.   7
scattered agricultural sector, making tax collection difficult and costly. The key to 
supporting the non-viable firms was to completely reject market mechanisms by artificially 
distorting the relative prices of factors and products. The cost of developing heavy 
industries had to be decreased artificially, while resource mobilization—including the 
supply of cheap labour, funds, raw materials, imported equipment, and technology—had to 
be improved. As a result, a macro policy environment was needed to allocate resources in 
a way that would encourage the development of heavy industries. Such a policy 
environment includes various components:  
(1) The most important condition needed for fast, low-cost growth of heavy industry is 
low-price capital, so a low interest rate policy and other financial repression policies 
were adopted by the government.  
(2) To ensure that key projects could import the critical equipments at low prices, the 
Chinese government had to interfere in the formulation of the foreign exchange rate by 
artificially overvaluing home currency and by instituting a low exchange rate policy.  
(3) Following the policies for reducing capital costs, the government suppressed the cost 
of labour and other inputs (so-called ‘a policy of low nominal wages and low prices for 
energy and raw materials’) in order to enhance the potential for surplus accumulation 
of heavy industry.  
(4) The low-wage policy held down the purchasing power of urban residents. The solution 
for sustaining worker welfare was to set low prices for agricultural products and 
essential goods and services. Because large-scale industries were concentrated in urban 
areas, the low-cost policy was targeted toward urban populations, and rural populations 
did not benefit from it.  
 




























































































































































Pr i ce  Pr emiu m  o f A gric u ltra l P ro d u c ts  in  In fo rm al   M ar ket (Bazaar ) re la tiv e  to  S ta te  P ro c u re m e n t P ric e  8
Due to the policy of low prices for agricultural products and other essential goods and 
services, a large proportion of the costs of heavy industry development were transferred to 
traditional economic sectors such as agriculture. In Figure 3 we compare the price level of 
grain in the rural informal market with government procurement prices to indicate how the 
relative price of the agriculture was suppressed under the traditional macro policy 
environment from 1950s to 1980s.  
 
A macro policy environment that distorts prices of products and production factors thus 
causes a serious imbalance between the supply and the demand of funds, foreign exchange, 
raw materials, agricultural products, and other basic necessities. If the market had been 
allowed to direct resource allocation, the policy of suppressing prices could not have 
ensured that these resources would flow to strategic sectors. To replace the role of the 
market in allocating resources and also to ensure that materials and resources in short 
supply would be allocated to prioritized industries, the government had to create a new set 
of institutions.  



















The planned administrative means can be summarized as follows. (1) The first step was to 
establish a financial administration institution. Between 1949 and 1952, China gradually 
completed the primary nationalization of banks. In 1953, the People’s Bank of China 
established credit plan managerial bureaus at various levels of its underling banks to work 
out and implement overall credit and loan plans. Within the bank, a corresponding credit 
fund internal control system with unified revenue and expenditure management was 
imposed. (2) The second step was to establish a management system for foreign trade and 
exchange. The state made a unified arrangement for imports and exports by imposing a 




















































































































The  St at e  Budget ar y  I nvest m e n t in  C apita l C onst r uct i on  t o  Tot al   I nvest m e n t in  C apita l C onst r uct i on  9
and exchange. (3) The third step was to establish a monopoly system to manage the 
allocation of materials and the procurement and marketing of agricultural products. Based 
on these administrative means, most of resource allocation was controlled by government. 
From Figure 4, we can find a large proportion of capital construction investment in China 
was allocated by the fiscal budget directly before economic reform. 
 
To manage the planning system, China established the State Planning Commission in 1953, 
whose function was to allocate important materials across the country. The commission 
classified the materials into three categories: (1) materials under the unified allocation of 
the state; (2) materials under allocation by state industrial ministries and commissions 
under the state council; and (3) materials under the allocation of the local administration. 
Table 1 shows the basic figures for the materials of the first two categories from 1950s to 
1980s. From 1953-57 the number of different types of industrial products under direct 
distribution by the government increased rapidly. The types of materials under unified 
distribution increased from 227 to 532. But, after the economic reform, the direct 
allocation by the state of materials dramatically decreased in 1980s. 
Table 1: Number of types of materials under government control in China (1950-88) 
Year  Under the unified state 
distribution system 
Under the mandatory plans of corresponding 
departments in state council 
1950 8       
1951 33       
1952 55       
1953 112    115   
1954 121    140   
1955 162    139   
1956 234    151   
1957 231    301   
1958 93    336   
1959 67    218   
1960 75    342   
1961 87    416   
1962 153    345   
1963 256    260   
1964 370    222   
1965 370    222   
1966 326    253   
1972 49    168   
1973 50    567   
1975 52    565   
1978 53    636   
1979 210    581   
1981 256    581   
1988 27    45   
Source: Authors.   10
There was a strong demand for light industry goods because of insufficient market supply; 
at the same time, the technological structure of light industries catered well to the 
comparative advantages of the Chinese economy. With the state focused on developing 
heavy industry, investment in the suppressed industries would tend to yield high returns. 
Because the profit-oriented private enterprises would allocate their resources to the sectors 
that yielded the highest returns, the state had to nationalize private enterprises. Figure 5 
shows that government made a big push for the nationalization movement towards the 
industrial firms in 1950s. 

















Because of information asymmetry, monitoring costs to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
for the state was prohibitively high. In particular, since prices were distorted by macro 
policy, profits and losses ceased to reflect management’s performance. When competition 
was eliminated after private enterprises were artificially destroyed, and the allocation of 
goods and resources was carried out only by the state, profits and losses for enterprises in 
an industry ceased to be a function of their market competitiveness. Under these conditions, 
it was impossible for SOEs with autonomy in production and management to avoid 
encroaching on the surplus. As a result, on the basis of an ownership arrangement, the state 
chose to deprive SOEs of any autonomy. All production materials used by SOEs were 
supplied by the government, and all their output was sold to and allocated by the state. And, 
it was imperative to establish a compulsory production plan system and a unified revenue 
and expenditure system.  
 
Accompanying the nationalization of industry, the collectivization of agriculture through 
the People’s Commune System was also accelerated, which was an important step toward 
realizing the state monopoly policy of procurement of agricultural products at a low price. 












































































































T h e  R a tio  o f In d u s tria l O ut pu t o f S O E  t o  Tot al   I ndust r i al   O ut put  11
exercise direct control over agricultural production. Collectivization should be an 
institutional arrangement by which the government can upgrade its direct control over 
agricultural production.6  
 
Here, we trace the formation of the trinity system in accord with the enforcement of CAD 
strategy in China. Obviously, a highly centralized trinity system inevitably undermined the 
incentives of local agents. To facilitate the implementation of central targets, some 
measures were adopted for local government and SOEs in the pre-1978 reforms, which 
included (1) eliminating the central government’s over-concentration of power by 
decentralizing administrative authority and responsibility; and (2) eliminating unequal 
distribution of benefits among regions and sectors by adjusting their administrative 
authority and responsibility. As a special case, in early 1960s, the central government 
decentralized the autonomy to the farmers in order to recover the agricultural production 
from the Great Famine. However, the decentralization under a trinity system was not able 
to solve the inefficiency problem since it could neither improve micro efficiency through 
market discipline, nor change the heavy industry development strategy inconsistent with 
China’s comparative advantage. These reforms had not touched on the basic framework of 
the trinity system. Under the soft budget constraints faced by local government and SOEs, 
a cycle of decentralization leading to disorder, disorder leading to centralization, 
centralization leading to stagnation, and stagnation leading to decentralization was 
inevitable. In terms of this centralization cycle, the trinity system supporting the CAD 
strategy was not a stable institution.  
 
The economic reform that began in 1978 signified Chinese leaders’ search for a new path 
of economic development. The basic framework of trinity system and CAD strategy was 
no longer off limits, this enabled reform to penetrate all levels of the economic system. 
During this thorough and increasingly powerful reform compulsory plans were gradually 
replaced by indicative plans, and the planned allocation mechanism was replaced by a 
market mechanism. The new economic system gradually took shape. Our empirical 
measures could roughly capture the formation and collapse of trinity system. Comparing 
Figures 2-5 and Table 1, a co-movement trend can be found for the indicators measuring 
the economic institution and development strategy in China’s history. The measures 
peaked in the 1960s, and decreased gradually in 1970s, which means the changing 
structure of economic institution can be explained by the choice of development strategy. 
                                                 
6 An example is the Great Leap Forward Movement in economic construction launched in 1958, which 
proposed that China might surpass the United Kingdom’s level of economic development and catch up to that 
of the United States in ten years. Heavy industries were emphasized, especially iron and steel. Several 
preposterously high indicators of industrial development were fabricated. At the same time, the 
nationalization movement and policies for planning control were also pushed. Because of the inappropriate 
ratio of accumulation and the shortage of consumption funds, and also because agricultural production could 
not meet increasing needs, the government had to increase compulsory procurement quotas. In 1958, grain 
production increased by 2.55 per cent, but the quantity procured rose by 22.3 per cent. At the same time, 
agricultural collectivization was suddenly accelerated to ensure the low-price procurement of agricultural 
products. As is well known, its consequences were disastrous.   12
4 Conclusion 
According to Lin’s various studies, many developing countries, including those socialist 
countries such as Russia, East Europe Countries and China, and even many Latin 
American countries and India, that adopted an import substitution strategy after the Second 
World War were actually adopting a forward moving development strategy. However, for 
most LDCs, capital was in short supply; hence the market interest rate was naturally high, 
while the cost of labour was low. Developing capital-intensive heavy industries was thus 
extremely costly, and such industries could not hope to be viable in an open, free market 
economy. Thus, the government had to distort the economic institution, and nationalize the 
resources, so as to sustain the non-viable industry. From this perspective, our study sheds 
light on the inherent laws for a variety of regulatory policies and intervention syndromes in 
LDCs in an integrated framework, which can be summarized as a trinity system including 
the macro policy environment, highly centralized planned resource allocation system and 
dependent micro management institution. This point is in contrast with the existing 
theories of political economy, the so-called helping hand versus grabbing hand taxonomy. 
That means, heavily regulations on the economy in LDCs might not be due to the 
corruption of politicians or manipulation of interest group, but the CAD strategy by 
government.  
 
Although we illustrate the above argument only by the empirical evidence of China, the 
formation of the trinity system as a result of the adoption of a CAD strategy should not be 
unique to China or particular to the socialist system. Therefore, the formation, 
consequences, and reform process of China’s traditional economic institution have 
valuable implications for other socialist economies and developing countries that adopted 
the development strategies similar to China’s. In short, the liberalization reforms will 
depend on the final removal of the viability problem that exists in many firms in the 
priority sectors under the previously adopted CAD strategy.  
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